Global inflation by Ciccarelli, Matteo & Mojon, Benoît
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO. 537 / OCTOBER 2005
GLOBAL INFLATION
by Matteo Ciccarelli
and Benoît MojonIn 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 537 / OCTOBER 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 







1   We would like to thank Sandrine Corvoisier for excellent research assistance and an anonymous referee,Michel Aglietta,Filippo Altissimo,
OECD,the IMF and the Bank of Canada for useful comments on this research project.We are very grateful to Daniel Levy for detailed
and constructive comments on the draft.The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
2   Corresponding author:European Central Bank,DG Research,Kaiserstrasse 29,60311 Frankfurt am Main,Germany;
e-mail:matteo.ciccarelli@ecb.int
3   Université de la Méditerranée and European Central Bank,DG Research,Kaiserstrasse 29,60311 Frankfurt am Main,Germany;
e-mail:Benoit.Mojon@ecb.int
Michael Bordo,Gabriel Fagan,Domenico Giannone,Ronald McKinnon,Jeffrey Frankel,Anil Kashyap,Nobu Kiyotaki,Simone Manganeli,
ECB,or ECB policy.Remaining errors are of the authors.
Cyril Monnet,Philippe Moutot,Lucrezia Reichlin,Frank Smets,Mike Wickens,Michael Woodford and seminar participants at the ECB,the© European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and
reprint in the form of a different
publication, whether printed or
produced electronically, in whole or in
part, is permitted only with the explicit
written authorisation of the ECB or the
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from










2 Inflation as a global phenomenon 9
2.1 Estimating global inflation 11
2.2 Descriptive statistics 13
3 What is driving global inflation? 15
3.1 Methodology 15
3.2 Results 17
4 The dynamics of national and global inflation 20
4.1 Global inflation is “attractive” 20
4.2 A new benchmark for forecasting
inflation? 22




Tables and figures 32
European Central Bank working paper series 48Abstract 
 
This paper shows that inflation in industrialized countries is largely a global phenomenon. First, 
inflations of (22) OECD countries have a common factor that alone account for nearly 70% of 
their variance. This large variance share that is associated to Global Inflation is not only due to 
the trend components of inflation (up from 1960 to 1980 and down thereafter) but also to 
fluctuations at business cycle frequencies. Second, Global Inflation is, consistently with standard 
models of inflation, a function of real developments at short horizons and monetary developments 
at longer horizons. Third, there is a very robust "error correction mechanism" that brings national 
inflation rates back to Global Inflation. This model consistently beats the previous benchmarks 
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The paper aims at checking the hypothesis that inflation is a global phenomenon, and 
understanding the common economic forces which have been driving inflation in the OECD 
since 1960. We proceed in four sequential steps. We start by estimating a measure of Global 
Inflation using the quarterly inflation series of 22 OECD countries. Subsequently, we discuss 
the possible determinants of the estimated Global inflation. Then we study the joint dynamics 
of national and Global Inflation by: (i) assuming that the common factor representation 
captures a long run relationship between national and global inflations, and (ii) estimating an 
Error Correction type model for national inflations. Finally we check whether it is possible to 
exploit the commonality across inflation processes to improve the inflation forecast upon 
existing benchmarks, and we also provide new insights on inflation persistence. 
 
    Our main results can be summarized as follows. 
 
    First the intuition that inflation is global is decidedly confirmed by the data. We indeed 
show that a simple average of 22 OECD countries inflation accounts for 70 % of the variance 
of inflation in these countries between 1960 and 2003. The qualitative result is not only robust 
to different sample periods, but is also independent of whether the analysis is performed on 
the inflation processes or on their de-trended measures. In fact, we find that the variance 
explained by a simple average of the 22 de-trended inflations is about 36 percent on average, 
indicating that a common Global factor is an important source of variability for inflation also 
at higher frequencies. 
 
    Second, we document how global inflation can be described as a function of essentially 
(global) real developments at short horizons and (global) monetary developments at longer 
horizons, thus confirming the validity of a Global augmented Phillips curve. This result is 
important because it provides support for analyzing inflation directly at the global level and 
because it confirms that the 70% of inflation variance that is global depends on both real and 
monetary developments. 
 
    Third, Global Inflation is an attractor of national inflation, in that national deviations from 
the common factor are reverted. The evidence is again uniform and robust across different 
sample periods and different countries. We also document differences in the impact of Global 
Inflation across countries and find, for instance, that countries that have experienced stronger 
commitment to price stability (e.g. Germany) are less affected than those with weaker 
inflation discipline (e.g. Italy). Interestingly and perhaps more importantly, this kind of "Error 
Correction Mechanism" helps in predicting national inflation of nearly all OECD countries at 
various horizons and over several samples. As a result, our forecasting model of inflation 
consistently outperforms state of the art forecasting models such as the AR(p), the standard 
Factor AR(p) and the Random Walk models of inflation.  These results designate our Global 
Inflation model as a potential new standard for forecasting inflation in OECD countries. 
 
    Finally, the potential importance of the global component of inflation led us to reconsider 
also the current debate on inflation persistence. In particular, conditional on the assumption of 
a common mean of inflation, the persistence of the idiosyncratic components is hardly 
different from zero from a statistical point of view over most of the considered sample. This 
result shows that what is left in national inflations after accounting for their common aspects 
has had very little structure over the last 45 years. Moreover, even when taken globally, 
inflation is less persistent than it used to be. 
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October 2005"We are [ ::: ] very much dependent on the global evolution. We have an idea
of the global evolution, but there are risks at the global level that we have to take
into account."
(Jean-Claude Trichet, 2 December 2004 press conference, Frankfurt)
1 Introduction
The idea that national macroeconomic developments depend on international conditions is not
new. Only recently however we are starting to get measures of this dependence. For instance,
Forni and Reichlin (2001) show that the share of the European common component in the
variance decomposition of European regional output is larger than the national component.
Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), KOW thereafter, ￿nd that the world common component
to expenditure time series of 60 countries explains between one fourth and one third of the
variance of these series in OECD countries. As KOW put it:
\[...] Understanding the sources of international economic ￿uctuations is impor-
tant both for developing business cycle models and making policy".
A similar result is obtained in Canova et al. (2004), who demonstrate the presence of
a signi￿cant world cycle using G7 data and show that country speci￿c indicators play a much
smaller role while no evidence of the existence of a Euro speci￿c cycle nor of its emergence in
the late 1990s is found.
By de￿nition, the main risk of ignoring international developments is to overrate the
importance of domestic developments. And these include domestic macroeconomic policies.
Surprisingly, the studies of global macroeconomic developments have mostly focused on
the real business cycle. However, the ￿uctuations of in￿ation have been strikingly similar
around the world. All OECD countries have experienced long term swings in the level of
in￿ation. In￿ation has progressively risen in the 1960s and 1970s before it declined in the
1980‘s. In￿ation has further declined in the early to mid-1990‘s and has since then remained
low and stable.
One formal representation of these long term shifts in in￿ation focuses on the occurrence
of breaks in the mean of in￿ation. State of the art break tests indicate that in￿ation series admit
6
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is that breaks in the mean of in￿ation cluster within three relatively short periods: between
1968 and 1972, between 1982 and 1984 and between 1991 and 1993 (Table 1 of Corvoisier and
Mojon, 2004). The coincidence of these sharp changes to the in￿ation process suggests that
they may have common causes.
Levin and Piger (2004) note that the 1990’s disin￿ation coincide with changes in the
monetary policy regimes, most notably the spreading of in￿ation targeting. Rogo￿ (2003) also
acknowledges the merits of central banks tighter focus on price stability in the e￿ectiveness
of disin￿ation. He however wonders whether there could be some other common causes un-
derlying disin￿ation, indicating the respective role of improved monetary policy, sounder ￿scal
policies, acceleration of productivity, deregulation and globalization as possible causes. His
main conclusion is that no factor alone seems to fully explain the progress that the world has
made in containing in￿ation.
In our opinion the previous studies on the topic su￿er from at least two drawbacks. First,
they restrict their analyses to the post 1980 disin￿ation, hence disregarding the possibility that
the previous phase, i.e. the acceleration of in￿ation between 1960 and 1980, was also very
much a shared experience of most countries of the world (McKinnon, 1982). Second, they
focus strictly on the downward trend or on downward breaks of the in￿ation process, while, as
we show in this paper, there is more than su￿cient evidence of co-movements of in￿ation at
the business cycle frequencies as well.
The paper aims at checking the hypothesis that in￿ation is a global phenomenon, and
understanding the common economic forces which have been driving in￿ation in OECD coun-
tries. We proceed in four sequential steps. We start by estimating a measure of Global In￿ation
using the quarterly in￿ation series of 22 OECD countries (Section 2). Subsequently, we dis-
cuss the possible determinants of the estimated Global in￿ation (Section 3). Then we study
the joint dynamics of national and Global In￿ation by: (i) assuming that the common factor
representation captures a long run relationship between national and global in￿ations, and (ii)
estimating an Error Correction type model for national in￿ations. Finally we check whether
7
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forecast upon existing benchmarks, and we also provide new insights on in￿ation persistence
(Section 4).
Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First the intuition that in￿ation is global is decidedly con￿rmed by the data. We indeed
show that a simple average of 22 OECD countries in￿ation accounts for 70 % of the variance of
in￿ation in these countries between 1960 and 2003. The qualitative result is not only robust to
di￿erent sample periods, but is also independent of whether the analysis is performed on the
in￿ation processes or on their de-trended measures. In fact, we ￿nd that the variance explained
by a simple average of the 22 de-trended in￿ations is about 36 percent on average, indicating
that a common Global factor is an important source of variability for in￿ation also at higher
frequencies.
Second, we document how global in￿ation can be described as a function of essentially
(global) real developments at short horizons and (global) monetary developments at longer
horizons, thus con￿rming the validity of a Global augmented Phillips curve ￿ a la Gerlach (2003).
This result is important because it provides support for analyzing in￿ation directly at the global
level and because it con￿rms that the 70% of in￿ation variance that is global depends on both
real and monetary developments.
Third, Global In￿ation is an attractor of national in￿ation, in that national deviations
from the common factor are reverted. The evidence is again uniform and robust across dif-
ferent sample periods and di￿erent countries. We also document di￿erences in the impact of
Global In￿ation across countries and ￿nd, for instance, that countries that have experienced
stronger commitment to price stability (e.g. Germany) are less a￿ected than those with weaker
in￿ation discipline (e.g. Italy). Interestingly and perhaps more importantly, this kind of \Error
Correction Mechanism" helps in predicting national in￿ation of nearly all OECD countries at
various horizons and over several samples. As a result, our forecasting model of in￿ation con-
sistently outperforms AR(p), standard Factor AR(p) and Random Walk models of in￿ation as
8
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these results designate our Global In￿ation model as a potential new standard for forecasting
in￿ation in OECD countries.
Finally, the potential importance of the global component of in￿ation led us to reconsider
also the current debate on in￿ation persistence. In particular, conditional on the assumption of
a common mean of in￿ation, the persistence of the idiosyncratic components is hardly di￿erent
from zero from a statistical point of view over most of the considered sample. This result shows
that what is left in national in￿ations after accounting for their common aspects has had very
little structure over the last 40 years. Moreover, even when taken globally, in￿ation is less
persistent than it used to be.
As a ￿nal remark, we shall note that the economic and econometric arguments we use
in this paper do not claim to drain all the reasons why in￿ation could be driven by Global
outcomes, nor pretend to be exhaustive on the empirical investigation of our ￿ndings. We
are con￿dent, however, that our results may provide a good starting point for exploring the
hypothesis that in￿ation should {to some extent{ be modelled as a global rather than a local
phenomenon.
2 In￿ation as a global phenomenon
In an integrated world economy, in￿ationary and de￿ationary shocks do not spread across
countries thanks to exchange rate adjustments. The nominal exchange rate should compensate
for accumulated in￿ation di￿erentials. Analyses of exchange rates have however showed that
fundamentals explain at best a small fraction of the exchange rate ￿uctuations (Flood and Rose,
1995). Recently, Reinhart and Rogo￿ (2003) challenged the common wisdom that exchange
rates have been ￿exible since the break up of Bretton Woods. They show that since 1971,
e￿ective ￿oating exchange rates have been the exception rather than the rule. Only 4% of their
country-year observations correspond to e￿ective ￿oating exchange rates. They relate this low
number to some sort of broad "fear of ￿oating" among policy makers (Calvo and Reinhart,
1For recent systematic comparisons of forecasting models of in￿ation see Stock and Watson (1999, 2003),
Banerjee et al (2003) and Banerjee and Marcellino (2002).
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of the 1970’s may have spread to other countries because their monetary authorities could only
partially sterilize the increase in the central banks’ foreign exchange reserves that resulted from
their attempts to limit the depreciation of the dollar.
Now, if the key adjustment mechanism which can isolate an economy from foreign shocks
to prices is not functioning, then in￿ation might be determined, at least to some extent, at an
international level, increase.2 Moreover, even if exchange rates partially adjust for accumulated
in￿ation di￿erentials, there are other reasons for co-movement of in￿ation across countries, some
of them being relevant for the trend component of in￿ation, others for in￿ation ￿uctuations at
business cycle or higher frequencies.
The trend component of in￿ation might re￿ect the objective of the central bank and this
objective is not de￿ned in vacuum. There could be some international pressures among or on
top of monetary authorities. These "peer pressures" can arise through several channels. For
example, the continuous exchange of views among Central Banks through o￿cial meetings,
conferences and publications can lead to such a peer pressure. Hence, the dominant approach
on the best monetary policy practise, being it good or bad, may be re￿ected in the level of
in￿ation throughout the world. The spread of In￿ation Targeting monetary policy strategy in
the early 1990’s is perhaps a more striking example of the potential power of this "peer pressure"
channel. Another channel could potentially be identi￿ed with the endogenous equilibrium
mechanisms that make a community of central banks (or of groups of central bank watchers)
converge to relative rather than absolute benchmarks of success. Typically, performing badly
on the in￿ation record is more tolerable when others perform badly as well. Empirical studies
on ￿scal policy have shown, for instance, that the ￿scal discipline of US’s states tend to be
correlated with the one of neighboring states, about which, arguably, the electorate are better
informed (Besley and Case, 1995).
2Along the same line of argument, the Gold Standard is usually associated to a more uniform in￿ation
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1979 and several also consider that the mid-1980’s disin￿ation is linked to the 1986 counter oil
shock. In the short run, the changes in the price of commodities, which are traded worldwide,
have a systematic e￿ect on the price of raw materials and energy that make up a signi￿cant
share of consumer price indices. In addition, New Keynesian have showed that, in a number
of OECD countries, Phillips curves models of in￿ation is not rejected by the data. Therefore,
the ￿ndings of KOW and others on the co-movement in national business cycles should imply,
through Phillips curve e￿ects, co-movement of national in￿ation rates as well.
2.1 Estimating Global In￿ation
In what follows, we brie￿y describe and compare results for four alternative measures of Global
In￿ation, namely:
1. a cross-country average,
2. the aggregate OECD in￿ation, published by the OECD,
3. a measure based on static factor analysis, and
4. a measure based on dynamic factor analysis.
Results reported in subsequent sections are mainly based on the simplest and most
intuitive measure, the cross-country average.
The \average" measure is the simple average of the year on year in￿ation rates of the 22
countries that have been members of the OECD for most of the sample period 1961:2{2004:4.3
The aggregate OECD in￿ation is a weighted average of all OECD countries’ in￿ation, where
the weights are proportional to GDP. Regarding the common factor analysis, we opted for a
parsimonious approximate factor representation (see e.g. Forni et al., 2000; Stock and Watson,










3The 8 OECD countries that we do not include in our sample are Mexico, Korea, Turkey, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic and Iceland.
Beyond the trend of in￿ation, it is a fact that countries are also subject to common
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sponds di￿erently through ￿, whereas the last term refers to the idiosyncratic dynamics which
captures the components generated by shocks whose e￿ects remain local. Our speci￿cation in
the dynamic case assumes the common factor to be an AR(1) process, e.g.
ft = aft￿1 + ut: (2)
We assume orthogonality between ft and "t, and normality of the error terms, with "t ￿
N (0;R), and ut ￿ N (0;Q).
Estimation of (1)-(2) is obtained using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm
(Doz, Giannone and Reichlin, 2004). Data have been previously demeaned and standardized
to have unit variance before estimating ft.4 The raw data are the CPI indices that are avail-
able quarterly from the OECD main economic indicators database from 1960 onward. Our
analysis focuses on quarterly year-on-year (y-o-y) in￿ation rates, which, by construction, have
no seasonal pattern.
Figure 1 reports the four measures of Global In￿ation.5 Three observations are in order.
First, the \average" and the factor model measures are almost identical, while the OECD
aggregate deviates from the other 3 series, especially in the second half of the 1980’s. Second,
the ￿uctuations and trends in the Global In￿ation re￿ect the major events of the last 45 years.
All measures are characterized by two trends, up from 1960 until the late-1970s (associated
with the two oil shocks and the decline in OECD productivity) and down thereafter (re￿ecting
tight monetary policies and the debt crisis), and, ￿ve or six cycles along the way. Given that
both the 1970’s Great In￿ation and the subsequent tight monetary policy have been observed
in most countries, the trend components of Global In￿ation perhaps should not come as a
surprise. As a matter of fact, Corvoiser and Mojon (2005) show that breaks in the mean of
in￿ation largely coincide through out the OECD: around 1970, around 1982 and, to a lesser
extent, around 1992.
4MATLAB codes developed by D. Giannone have been adapted and used here.
5The OECD aggregate and the \average" have been de-meaned and standardized for the ￿gure.
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In￿ation, Figure 2 report the in￿ation series of the G7 and of the Euro area with their pro-
jections on the common factor. Visual inspection reveals not only that the trend is captured
accurately, but also that the most relevant cyclical movements are indeed common.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the share of the variance of national in￿ation series that is explained Global
in￿ation6 for each of the four measures introduced in the previous section : the simple cross-
country average, the OECD aggregate in￿ation, the ￿rst static common factor and the ￿rst
dynamic common factor. In each case, the national idiosyncratic variance is the complement
to one of the ￿gures reported in the table. The last column also shows the share of the
variance explained by the second dynamic factor. Finally, the table also reports the variance
decomposition exercise for the euro area in￿ation rate.
First, all measures of Global in￿ation explain more than two thirds of national in￿ation
rates ￿uctuations on average. The co-movement of in￿ation is decidedly large. By way of
comparison, we ￿nd that the global business cycle accounts "only" for about one third of the
variance of industrial production growth in OECD countries.7 It is also clear that the second
common factor of the in￿ation series explains only a very limited share of the variance of
national in￿ation series, on average. We consider this fraction small enough that we can model
national in￿ation rates with one common factor only. We also note that the OECD aggregate
in￿ation under performs the other three measures. We conjecture that this is because this
aggregate includes countries that are not in our sample. Moreover, within our sample of
countries, we also found that averages that are weighted by country size under perform the
factors and the simple unweighted average (not reported).
Table 1 ranks (the column ‘average’ being the reference) the countries by increasing
share of the in￿ation variance that is explained by the common factor. Only ￿ve countries
6This share is de￿ned as ￿
2
ivar(ft)=var(￿it). It is equivalent to the R-square of a regression of the national
in￿ation rate on Gloabl In￿ation and a constant.
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Greece being the exception, are usually seen as low in￿ation economies. We also note that the
ranking of the countries has little to do with geography. In particular, the fact that the non-
European countries are spread through out the distribution cast doubt on the argument that
Global In￿ation among OECD countries is just a re￿ection that a majority of these countries
are located in Europe.8
Because this variance decomposition may simply re￿ect common trends in the in￿ation
series, we now explore how much of the business cycle ￿uctuations in in￿ation are correlated
across countries. In Table 2 we report (again ranked taking the column ‘average’ as reference)
estimates of the share of de-trended in￿ation that is associated to a common factor. The
national in￿ation series were detrended using Baxter and King (1999) band pass ￿lter, which
extracts cycles of length comprised between 6 and 32 quarters long with a truncation of 12
lags. These cyclical components of in￿ation are then used for extracting the common factor at
business cycles frequencies. Again, the share of national in￿ation variance that is common is
very large by any standard with mean and median of the order of 36 percent.9
The co-movement of in￿ation is not only due to the trend component associated with
the 1970’s great in￿ation and the coincidence of the countries’s in￿ations gradual acceleration
up to 1980 and the gradual disin￿ation that followed. Global In￿ation actually explains a
large share of the in￿ation variance also in countries like Switzerland and Germany, that is
countries where the 1970’s in￿ation have been much smaller than in the average of OECD
countries. A comparison of the ranking of countries in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that, across
di￿erent methods, the rank is roughly preserved. Moreover, in relative terms, Global In￿ation
seems to matter more at business cycle frequencies for low-in￿ation countries, where the share
of variance explained by Global In￿ation is among the lowest when we don’t remove the trend
8We actually estimated another measure of Global In￿ation using a sample of six countries evenly split across
time zones: Canada, US, UK, the euro area, Japan and Australia. We obtain a even higher median (0.79)
and mean (0. 77) share of in￿ation variance that is explaned by Global In￿ation. This result reinforces our
conjecture that the comovement of national in￿ation rates does not necessarily re￿ect only European economic
developments.
9These results hold for other detrending methods such as the HP ￿tler or the ￿rst di￿erenc ￿lter of in￿ation.
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in some countries with low in￿ation discipline (e.g. Spain and Portugal) the common factor
of de-trended in￿ation does not have any explanatory power for local in￿ation developments,
whereas the non de-trended measure explains between 70 and 80 percent of their total variances.
To complete our description of Global In￿ation, we have computed its cross-correlation
with national in￿ation series at several leads and lags. This exercise is useful in ￿guring out
whether in￿ation tends to lag or lead Global In￿ation in some of the countries. Results (not
reported, but available upon request) show that almost no country is markedly leading or
lagging Global developments. This allows us to discard the possibility that one particular
country has been systematically leading the rest of the OECD countries and that, if this
country had been large enough, our focus on Global In￿ation mistakenly would have picked up
the leadership of the country in terms of in￿ation dynamics.
3 What is driving Global In￿ation?
Given the ￿nding that Global In￿ation explains a substantial proportion of the local in￿ation
variance, this section tackles the sources of global in￿ation. It is indeed crucial to understand
what causes this process and to gain some insights into what the global factor is really capturing.
To determine whether, when and by how much Global In￿ation may be linked to oil, real or
monetary shock or a combination of these and perhaps other shocks, we evaluate the predictive
power of a set of standard in￿ation determinants. We proceed with a Bayesian model selection
analysis which is particularly suited to select relevant regressors among a wide pool of candidate
explanatory variables.
In what follows, therefore, we ￿rst explain the methodology used to select the best
predictors for Global In￿ation and then present the results.
3.1 Methodology
Under the Bayesian model selection procedure, we search over several possible model speci￿ca-
tions according to the explanatory variables used (e.g. George and McCulloch, 1993 and Koop,
2003). Generally speaking, the problem in building a multiple linear regression model is the
15
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￿t+h = a(L)￿t + b(L)xt + "t+h (3)
where, ￿t is our measure of global in￿ation and xt represents a set of K possible predictors
over three horizons h = 1;4;8. Thus we are searching for those explanatory variables which
have the highest predictive power at di￿erent prediction horizons, while considering all possible
combination of covariates in the model.
Given that we dispose of a set of K potential explanatory variables (predictors), the
problem is to ￿nd the best model which only include a subset of selected covariates. Therefore,
the comparison must be done among 2K models. When K is a relatively high number the
computational requirements for usual procedures (e.g. AIC or BIC) are also high. In our case,
as discussed below, K is greater than 11, giving at least 2048 models to evaluate. We use a
Bayesian Model averaging approach as discussed in Koop (2003) and Fernandez et al. (2001),
where the "promising" subset of predictors is identi￿ed as those with the highest posterior prob-
ability. The latter is the frequency with which these variables appear in the search procedure
of the algorithm used. The algorithm is the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition
(MC3) (Madigan and York, 1995), which draws samples from the posterior distribution of the
2K models.
The concept of Bayesian Model averaging can be simply described using the rules of
probability. Denote with Mk, (k = 1;:::;K), our K di￿erent models, each characterized by
a prior for the parameter vector p(￿k j Mk); the likelihood p(y j ￿k;Mk) and the posterior
p(￿k j y;Mk). Using Bayes theorem, the posterior model probabilities, p(Mk j y), can be ob-
tained and used to assess the degree of support for model Mk.10 From the comparison of all
the models a ranking of the best predictors can be obtained. In our case, the likelihood, the
prior and the posterior of parameters, as well as the search algorithm are the same as in Koop
10In formulae, it is
p(Mk j y) =
p(y j Mk)p(Mk)
p(y)
where p(Mk) is the prior model probability, i.e. our prior subjective support for the model, and p(y j Mk) is
the marginal likelihood, i.e. what the data should look like under model Mk before seeing the data iteself. The
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the variable, calculated as the proportion of models drawn by the MC3 algorithm which contain
the corresponding predictor, the average estimate of their e￿ect (b) as well as of their posterior
standard deviation. The posterior probability of the variable can be used as a diagnostic to
determine whether a given predictor plays an important role in explaining global in￿ation
developments. It is comparable to a Granger causality test in a multivariate setting, where
variables are simultaneously included and optimally chosen.
In the ￿nal step, we use a selection of the most frequent predictors of in￿ation as obtained
from the previous Bayesian procedure to estimate a VAR model where the endogenous variables
are the Global in￿ation and its selected determinants. The main purpose of this exercise is to
decompose the variance of Global In￿ation as explained by each determinant.
3.2 Results
We limit our analysis to a number of variables commonly argued to a￿ect in￿ation. Among
these, a ￿rst group of explanatory variables are de￿ned and computed as \common factors"
across the sample of countries for Industrial Production, Nominal Wages, Short-Term Interest
Rates, Long-term Interest Rates, the Yield Curve, Nominal and Real Money. Although not
exhaustive, these variables include the most likely determinants of in￿ation. Money and the
short-term interest rate are associated with monetary policy, either as instruments or as oper-
ating targets. The long-term interest rate is particularly interesting given that it re￿ects long
run in￿ation expectations. Wage in￿ation is a central link in propagating in￿ation shocks into
persistent changes. Finally, industrial production is included to evaluate a potential Phillips
curve. We choose industrial production because it is the most readily available indicator of the
business cycle that goes back to 1960 for all 22 countries that are in our sample.
For each variable, we extract a common factor in a similar way as we had done for in￿a-
tion. We therefore build measures of the world industrial production growth rate (W IP), the
world nominal wages in￿ation (W Wage), the world unit labour cost growth rate(W ULC), the
world import prices in￿ation (W MDP), the world monetary aggregate growth rate (W M3),
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W YC). For wages and interest rates, we distinguish between the global/world common compo-
nents that can be constructed back to the 1960’s, which, due to data unavailability, is computed
on the basis of a sub-set of countries, and a more comprehensive measure that is available only
from the 1980’s onward. The results that we report below correspond to the de￿nition of these
global indicators as simple cross-country averages. These averages of the variables explain
usually between 1/3 (e.g. for industrial production) and 1/2 (e.g. for interest rates) of the
variance of national time series on average across countries.11
We also check whether global in￿ation depends on genuine world shocks such as com-
modity prices and the US ￿scal de￿cit and the US stock market price. The latter appears a
priori relevant mostly for the ￿xed exchange rate regime that prevailed before 1973. The ￿scal
expansions of the country whose currency was the anchor of the exchange rate system can be
expected to have in￿ationary e￿ects throughout the world.
The results of the Bayesian selection algorithm are shown in Table 3. The prob column
gives the probability that the variable is signi￿cant, b gives the elasticity of global in￿ation
vis-￿ a-vis the variable and the last column gives the standard error of b. Several ￿ndings are
worth emphasizing.
First, global real activity (W IP) and wage in￿ation (W Wage) have a positive \e￿ect"
on Global In￿ation developments. We note that the e￿ect of W IP is the most signi￿cant at 1
quarter horizon and that it has declined in the last 20 years. Wages appear relevant especially
at 4 quarters horizon. These e￿ects tend to validate the existence of a Phillips curve at the
Global level with, potentially, an important role the labor markets developments. Again, their
e￿ect is somewhat blurred in the second sub-sample.
Second, indicators of monetary policy, the common component of money growth (W M3),
the short term interest rate (W STI) and the yield curve (W YC), acquire a greater predictive
power at 4 and 8 steps ahead forecasts. Regarding signs, it is worth stressing that the sign of
11Results using the dynamic factor or the existing OECD aggregates to compute the \Global" explanatory
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and for the last 20 years. This is consistent with a causality that goes from monetary policy
stance to in￿ation.
Turning now to the genuine common variables, we note further that indicators of the
US ￿scal (lack of) discipline are not very successful in forecasting Global In￿ation, except for
the US ￿scal de￿cit indicator in the ￿rst sub-sample. The sign of its e￿ect is positive but
never signi￿cant. The evidence for oil and commodity price is mixed as it tends to vary across
forecast horizons and sub-samples. Moreover, their sign is not always positive nor signi￿cant.
To conclude our description of the determinants of Global In￿ation, we report measures
of the share of Global In￿ation explained by the di￿erent variables within a multi-variate VAR.
We include in the VAR the variables that are most often signi￿cant in predicting in￿ation as
was shown in Table 3. These variables are W IP, the Oil price, W wages, W MMR, W Bond
and W M3.
Table 4 reports the share of Global In￿ation variance that is explained by each of these
variables after controlling for the other variables in the list. The estimation results are again
suggesting that it is more di￿cult to identify the determinants of in￿ation in the last 2 decades
than for the 1960’s and the 1970’s. We note in particular a drop in the variance explained
by industrial production and interest rates while wages are informative about in￿ation only
for the full sample. In the second sub-sample none of the variables seem to bear marginal
explanatory power on global in￿ation. This result may be due to collinearity among the in￿ation
determinants for that period. It may also re￿ect the improvement in the conduct of economic
policy which may have neutralized the shocks in the second part of the sample (Boivin and
Giannoni, 2003; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000) or at least, did not itself create shocks (Mojon,
2004).
Overall, the ￿ndings reported in this section demonstrate a robust sensitiveness of Global
In￿ation to real and monetary determinants when measured at the global level. This reinforces
the view that, possibly, economists working on in￿ation may need to reconsider the relevance
of closed economy models of in￿ation. As a matter of fact, in a majority of OECD countries,
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cant coe￿cients for any variables beyond the own lags of in￿ation itself (Corvoisier and Mojon,
2005). From this perspective, our results for Global In￿ation are good news because they show
that there exist one level of aggregation at which the determinants of in￿ation dictated by the-
ory are indeed signi￿cant. Finally, the response of Global In￿ation to both real determinants
{at short horizons{ and monetary determinants {at longer horizon{ invite central banks to
monitor both categories of in￿ation determinants. This surveillance, however, should be done
not only at the level of countries, but also more globally to account for the spillover of these
determinants across countries.
4 The Dynamics of National and Global In￿ation
In this section, we describe the impact of Global In￿ation on national in￿ation rates. We show
that Global In￿ation behaves as an attractor of the national in￿ation rates. This mechanism is
important both for practical purposes and to guide our understanding of the in￿ation process.
4.1 Global In￿ation is \attractive"
If we take Eq. (1) as a long run relationship between national in￿ations and the common factor,
then it is almost natural to set up an "Error Correction Mechanism" to specify the behavior
of the short run in￿ation dynamics.
Algebraically, it is possible to think of the following assumptions to derive a simple ECM
representation:
￿t = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿1 + ￿xt + ￿t (4)
where for the x variables a factor representation holds:
xt = ￿0ft + ￿1ft￿1 + !t
If we assume that the factor representation captures a long run relationship, then a simple alge-
bra conveniently derives the short-run dynamics for the ￿rst di￿erence of in￿ation as a function
of the "cointegration relation". Speci￿cally, if we subtract ￿t￿1 from both side of (4), then add
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on the right-hand side we obtain
￿￿t = ￿0 + ￿2 (￿t￿1 ￿ kft￿1) + ￿3￿ft + "t
where the new parameters are combination of the old ones and k = ￿ (￿0 + ￿1)=(1 ￿ ￿1) is the
long run multiplier of ￿t with respect to xt.
A more general representation can be shown to hold. For our purposes, and restricting
the analysis to a parsimonious speci￿cation with only one lag for the Error correction term, we
will be analyzing the following speci￿cation (now for each country i):
￿￿i;t = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1 (L)￿￿i;t￿1 + ￿i;2 (￿i;t￿1 ￿ ￿ift￿1) + ￿i;3 (L)￿ft + "i;t (5)
where ￿ is the ￿rst di￿erence operator, ￿i;j (L)are polynomial in the lag operator L, ￿i;t
is national in￿ation, ft is the common factor and ￿i is the factor loading of country i, which
provides the extent of the adjustment to a deviation from the common \equilibrium" of national
in￿ations.
Equation (5) has been estimated for every country over the sample 1961:2-2004:4 with
4 lags for both ￿￿i;t￿1 and ￿ft. In practical terms, (5) is estimated in two steps, by ￿rst
performing the standard common factor analysis and then plugging in (5) the idiosyncratic
term (￿i;t￿1 ￿ ￿ift￿1) and the ￿rst di￿erence of the factor ￿ft.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. In the ￿rst column we show the estimates
of ￿i, which is both the loading and the average long term response of national in￿ation to
Global In￿ation. As expected, this response to Global In￿ation is lower in countries with a
tight commitment to price stability, like Switzerland (CH) and Germany (DE), and higher in
countries that experienced the largest in￿ation ￿uctuations over the sample period (Portugal,
Italy, Spain among others).
The estimates of ￿2 and their t-statistics are shown in the other columns of Table 5.
Consistently with our intuition, it is clear that for all countries and, with exception of a few
countries, for all sample periods, there is a mechanism that pull back in￿ation towards Global
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at some point in future.
We ￿nd that the robustness of this mechanism across countries and sample periods is
astonishing. This is why, in the next section, we further test the relevance of our Global
In￿ation Error correction model by evaluating its performance in forecasting in￿ation.
4.2 A new benchmark for forecasting in￿ation?
A well documented results in the forecasting literature is that reliable leading indicators of
in￿ation are scarce. For example, Stock and Watson (1999, 2003), Banerjee et al (2003) and
Banerjee and Marcellino (2002) all conclude that, while some leading indicators of in￿ation
outperform the forecasts based on simple AR(p) models of in￿ation in some countries and
for some sample periods, none has yet emerged that systematically beat the AR(p) (typically
AR(2) of level in￿ation).
Given the results of the previous subsection, a forecast version of (5) can be obtained
using a speci￿cation similar to Stock and Watson (1999):
￿h
i;t+h ￿ ￿i;t = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1 (L)￿￿i;t + ￿i;2 (￿i;t ￿ ￿ift) + ￿i;3 (L)￿ft + "i;t+h (6)
where ￿h
i;t = (400=h)ln(Pt=Pt￿h) is the h-period annualized in￿ation in the price level Pt and
￿i;t = (100)ln(Pt=Pt￿4) is the y-o-y quarterly in￿ation rate.12 As before, the estimation here
must be performed in two steps, but at each time we compute the common factor and the
idiosyncratic terms using the information up to t and then forecast h periods ahead.
At least four natural competitors arise to assess the forecasting performance of (6). The
￿rst is an augmented AR with the common factor (FAR):
￿h
i;t+h ￿ ￿i;t = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1 (L)￿￿i;t + ￿i;3 (L)￿ft + "i;t+h (7)
The second is an AR of the form
￿h
i;t+h ￿ ￿i;t = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1 (L)￿￿i;t + "i;t+h (8)
12For a detailed discussion of this speci￿cation, see Stock and Watson (1999).
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￿h
i;t+h ￿ ￿i;t = "it+h (9)
A fourth benchmark can be considered along the lines of Stock and Watson (1999), Nicoletti-
Altimari (2000) and Gerlach (2003) by simply setting an augmented Phillips curve model where
the ￿rst di￿erence of in￿ation depends on its own lags and on the lags of the growth rates of
industrial production, oil price and M3.13
Speci￿cally, it is
￿h
i;t+h ￿ ￿i;t = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1 (L)￿￿i;t + ￿i;2 (L)￿IPit
+￿i;3 (L)￿M3it + ￿i;4 (L)￿Oilt + "i;t+h
Tables 6a-6c report the RMSE of our preferred speci￿cation (6) relative to the RMSE of the four
competing models. The experiment is conducted in a "real time" framework with all models
reestimated at each step using only information up to time t and by optimally choosing the
lag length. The evaluation and comparison are made over three forecasting periods, 1965-2003,
1985-95 and post 1995, and for eight forecasting horizons (quarters). We report results at three
horizon (1, 4 and 8 quarters). Clearly, our speci￿cation is preferred in a forecasting sense if the
reported statistic is lower than one.
Results show that our model outperforms the competing models in forecasting in￿ation
on average, across forecast horizon, over evaluation periods, and for the majority of the coun-
tries. Improvements are of the order of up to 25% with respect to the augmented Phillips
curve speci￿cation, 14% percent with respect to the RW and up to 10% with respect to the
standard AR or factor augmented AR. Our speci￿cation seems to perform particularly better
on forecast horizons greater than 1 and over the last 10-20 years of observations. Hence, while
the information pooling associated to a standard FAR or by an AR (possibly augmented with
Phillips curve arguments) is useful in short term predictions, it is the information contained
in the error correction mechanism that helps the most in forecasting medium and long run.
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as an anchor for national in￿ations and with a somewhat expected greater commonality among
in￿ations from the 1990’s (e.g. Rogo￿ (2003)).
Our preliminary conclusion, then, is that a simple parsimonious extension of a stan-
dard AR model, where we consider the attraction role of the Global In￿ation, outperform the
AR(p) model, which has been considered so far as the most robust predictor of in￿ation. The
results con￿rm also the importance of exploiting the international links and commonalities
as advocated by the recent empirical Factor-Model literature. What makes our contribution
particularly valuable is the interpretation of the factor representation as a long-run relation-
ship that parsimoniously allows for the use of an Error Correction Mechanism which, in turn,
seems to help in forecasting future developments of national in￿ation. The latter result, which
holds across countries, samples periods and forecasting horizons, is obliviously one of the main
contributions of our current research. Irrespective of whether we can formulate a \convincing"
structural model of the pull-back of national in￿ation toward Global In￿ation, our simple model
has the potential features of a new benchmark for forecasting in￿ation.
4.3 A new perspective on the persistence of in￿ation
The potential importance of the global component of in￿ation leads us to reconsider the current
debate on in￿ation persistence. Two main conclusions emerge from the recent studies on
in￿ation persistence. First, empirical estimates of in￿ation persistence fall considerably when
statistically signi￿cant shifts or breaks in the mean of in￿ation are accounted for. Robalo
Marques (2004), among others, has recently argued that the mean of in￿ation plays a crucial role
in the de￿nition of persistence and that any estimate of persistence should be seen conditional
on a given assumption for the mean of in￿ation.
Second, the question of what drives the break in the mean has not received a clear
answer yet. In some countries, there is a clear link between changes in the mean of in￿ation
and changes in the monetary policy regime. Bilke (2004) makes a convincing case that breaks
in French in￿ation are indeed driven by a change in the monetary regime. Levin and Piger
(2004) show how a break in the mean over the 90’s is common among countries that adopted
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is not limited to OECD countries that adopted in￿ation targeting. Rogo￿ (2004) show that the
disin￿ation of the last 20 years is a general feature of the world, including emerging and less
developed economies. Beyond the breaks (and potential changes in monetary policy regime)
of the early 1990’s, Corvoisier and Mojon (2004) stress that previous waves of breaks have
typically been accompanied by changes in the mean of nominal variables. This brings some
support to the view that breaks in the mean of in￿ation characterize changes in monetary
policy regimes.
What then should we make of the fact that national in￿ations appear to largely depend
on global factors? To answer this question, this section analyses separately the persistence of
the global and of the national in￿ations.
Both evidence on the importance of the mean of in￿ation and of common patterns in
possible breaks in the mean are consistent with the view that in￿ation is a global phenomenon.
Therefore, consistently with our ￿ndings, we propose to consider our measure of global in￿ation
as a common long run mean. It turns out that most of the in￿ation series of 22 OECD countries
exhibit little persistence once we control for the dependence of the national in￿ation processes
on Global In￿ation. To appreciate this result, consider Figures 4 and 5, where we report
time varying estimates of persistence (mean and 95% con￿dence bands) of the idiosyncratic
components of in￿ation of G7 and the euro area (Fig. 4), and of the Global In￿ation (Fig. 5).
Persistence is measured in terms of the sum of autoregressive coe￿cients using a univariate
AR(p) process for each in￿ation series:




where "t is a serially uncorrelated heteroschedastic error term and p is chosen optimally. If we
re-write the process as
￿t = ￿t + ￿t￿t￿1 +
p￿1 X
j=1
￿jt￿￿t￿j + "t (10)
then ￿t ￿
Pp
j=1 ￿jt is our \preferred" measure of persistence (e.g. Andrews and Chen, 1994).
We have estimated Eq. (10) using the Bayesian simulation smoother of DeJong and Shepard
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the uncertainty around the persistence mean is a 95% Highest Posterior Density Interval (e.g.
Koop, 2003, p. 43).
As it is clear from Figure 4, idiosyncratic components exhibit on average a persistence
not higher than 0.5-0.6, which means that, in the countries considered here, a temporary shock
to in￿ation is on average absorbed in 7-8 quarters at most. On the other hand, the persistence
of global in￿ation is on average higher than those of country in￿ations, and then it decreases
to a comparable mean level in the last part of the sample. Figures 4-5 also show that in￿ation
persistence might have not been stable over time. The question of stability is relevant from
an econometric point of view because any measure of persistence of a time-varying structure is
upward biased if time variation is not accounted for.
Some aspects of the ￿ndings are worth emphasizing. First, the general uncertainty
around the measure of persistence is increasing over time. This is in line with the recent
literature on in￿ation persistence (e.g. O’Reilly and Whelan, 2004). Second, US in￿ation has
lost structure in the last part of the sample with respect to the ￿rst part, which suggests that
deviations of US in￿ation from Global In￿ation ￿uctuations have become less interpretable
than they used to be. Notice, however, that with the exception of UK and perhaps Germany,
where persistence has been positively stable over time, for most countries ￿t is centered around
zero over the entire sample, meaning that what is left in national in￿ations after accounting
for their common component might not have much structure to be explained. This aspect
is possibly related to the ‘attractive’ characteristic of Global In￿ation and to the di￿erent
degrees of attraction across countries. From some preliminary time-varying estimation of the
matrix of coe￿cients through which countries load the common factor in Eq. (1), this seems
indeed to be the case. The loading ￿i, the relative importance of Global In￿ation for national
in￿ation, is indeed increasing for countries like United States and Canada, i.e., countries for
which we observe a clear decline in the persistence mean. Finally, in￿ation persistence has
been commonly decreasing in mean since 1980’s to values which are clearly below one (Fig.
5). Although the increasing uncertainty does not allow us to make more precise probability
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that the current monetary policy framework has had a certain impact on the persistence of
in￿ation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the in￿ation of the OECD countries have moved together
over the last 45 years. This comovement accounts for 70 % of the variability of country in￿a-
tion, on average. Moreover, deviations of individual countries in￿ation from Global In￿ation
are not persistent, and, even when taken globally, in￿ation is less persistent than it used to be.
Also, there is a powerful and robust \error correction mechanism" that brings national in￿a-
tion rates back toward the level of their long term projection on Global In￿ation. As a ￿rst
practical application of the idea of Global In￿ation, we present a fairly parsimonious model of
in￿ation forecast. The preliminary ￿ndings suggest that the new speci￿cation beats standard
competitors.
The main open question is to assess whether these results re￿ect some sort of statistical
\return to the mean" phenomenon or whether some deeper endogenous economic adjustments
are at work. For example, some determinants of in￿ation are Global: the price of commodities
is the same for all countries; KOW have shown that there is a global business cycle; Last but not
least, monetary and ￿nancial conditions may spill-over across countries. Such spill overs are, in
theory, less likely when exchange rates are ￿oating. However, Reinhart and Rogo￿ (2002) have
shown that, in spite of the break up of Bretton Woods, very few pure ￿oating exchange rates
regimes have been observed. Moreover, while it is hard to show in the data, our experience
as central bankers convince us that monetary policy concepts are e￿ectively spreading among
central banks. In some periods, bad monetary policy strategies are dominating for a majority
of countries. At other times, good strategies appear dominant.
We show that Global In￿ation indeed responds to commodity prices, the global business
cycle and the growth of the global liquidity. We further qualify that real developments are
more relevant at short horizons and monetary developments matter at longer horizons.
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Global In￿ation for local in￿ation, the nature of Global In￿ation brings support to the mon-
etary policy strategies that give importance both to real and monetary developments in their
assessment of in￿ationary pressures. Second, there may be a powerful externality between
country in￿ation records. Even if some countries were clearly less a￿ected by Global In￿ation
than others, none, not even Switzerland, can claim to have been completely immune from
Global In￿ation shocks.
Future research to which the authors will contribute should follow mainly three direc-
tions. The ￿rst one is to extend the sample of countries and regions to emerging markets, and
assess the importance of Global, regional and local mechanisms which help explaining in￿ation
developments. The second one is to explore more systematically the forecasting performance
of the Global In￿ation Error Correction Model, and compare it with the performance of other
univariate and multivariate speci￿cations, across other samples and cross sections of countries.
Finally, we should try to gain insights on the nature of the shocks that drive Global In￿a-
tion and their transmission to country in￿ations. To this respect, our general supposition is
that to a large extent the results reported in this paper may re￿ect the importance for central
bankers of exchanging views and cooperating in the design of their monetary policy concepts.
Paraphrasing the conclusion of the 1848 Communist Manifesto we would like to invite
"central bankers of all countries: unite!".
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October 2005Average OECD Static factor
first second
Australia 0.73 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.05
Austria 0.68 0.33 0.64 0.63 0.12
Belgium 0.83 0.55 0.83 0.82 0.03
Canada 0.82 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.02
Denmark 0.71 0.44 0.71 0.71 0.01
Finland 0.81 0.55 0.81 0.80 0.02
France 0.88 0.70 0.92 0.92 0.00
Germany 0.59 0.27 0.53 0.52 0.14
Greece 0.39 0.60 0.37 0.37 0.27
Ireland 0.85 0.61 0.89 0.89 0.00
Italy 0.85 0.79 0.89 0.89 0.04
Japan 0.53 0.20 0.48 0.47 0.25
Luxembourg 0.77 0.50 0.78 0.78 0.02
Netherlands 0.56 0.20 0.54 0.54 0.30
New Zeland 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.12
Norway 0.66 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.02
Portugal 0.61 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.12
Spain 0.73 0.54 0.74 0.75 0.03
Sweden 0.73 0.62 0.71 0.71 0.03
Switzerland 0.43 0.15 0.35 0.34 0.18
United Kindom 0.77 0.62 0.77 0.77 0.00
United States 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.01
mean 0.69 0.52 0.69 0.69 0.08
median 0.72 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.03
euro area 0.95 0.75 0.96 0.96 0.01
Table 1. Share of inflation variance explained by alternative measures of Global 
Inflation
Dynamic factors
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Australia 0.42 0.17 0.43 0.43
Austria 0.35 0.14 0.30 0.29
Belgium 0.63 0.36 0.73 0.74
Canada 0.36 0.25 0.34 0.35
Denmark 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.26
Finland 0.38 0.22 0.36 0.38
France 0.61 0.50 0.74 0.73
Germany 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.29
Greece 0.26 0.09 0.20 0.21
Ireland 0.57 0.27 0.62 0.63
Italy 0.63 0.37 0.70 0.68
Japan 0.54 0.30 0.54 0.53
Luxembourg 0.42 0.13 0.47 0.49
Netherlands 0.32 0.18 0.35 0.36
New Zeland 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09
Norway 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.05
Portugal 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03
Spain 0.26 0.14 0.18 0.18
Sweden 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.04
Switzerland 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.36
United Kindom 0.41 0.31 0.41 0.41
United States 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.46
mean 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.36
median 0.37 0.16 0.35 0.36
euro area 0.83 0.39 0.84 0.83
Table 2. Share of detrended inflation variance explained by 
alternative measures of Global Inflation
Note: 1961:2-2004:4. The inflation series are detrended by applying the band pass filter 
of Baxter and King (1999).The euro area aggregate inflation is not included in the pool 
of 22 countries used to estimate Global Inflation.
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October 2005Table 3. BMA Posterior probabilities and estimates, dependent variable is Global Inflation
1 step ahead 1961-2004 1961-1980 1981-2004
prob. b std of b prob. b std of b prob. b std of b
own 1.00 0.86 0.05 1.00 0.77 0.12 1.00 0.93 0.07
W_IP 1.00 0.07 0.02 0.94 0.09 0.04 0.33 0.01 0.02
W_Wages 0.98 0.12 0.04 0.97 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.09
W_STI 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.01
W_YC 0.79 -0.10 0.08 0.25 -0.05 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.02
W_M3 0.32 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.02
Com. Price 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00
Oil price 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00
US stock price 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00
US fiscal deficit 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.00
US gov. cons. 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01
4 steps ahead 1961-2004 1961-1980 1981-2004
prob. b std of b prob. b std of b prob. b std of b
own 1.00 0.40 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.04 1.00 0.86 0.14
W_IP 0.98 0.11 0.04 0.99 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.01
W_Wages 1.00 0.33 0.07 1.00 0.45 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.10
W_STI 0.14 -0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.21 -0.02 0.06
W_YC 0.33 -0.07 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.05
W_M3 1.00 0.25 0.04 1.00 0.19 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.07
Com. Price 1.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00
Oil price 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.94 -0.18 0.08 0.73 -0.04 0.03
US stock price 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00
US fiscal deficit 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.77 0.00 0.00
US gov. cons. 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.01
8 steps ahead 1961-2004 1961-1980 1981-2004
prob. b std of b prob. b std of b prob. b std of b
own 0.66 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.09 1.00 0.72 0.12
W_IP 0.50 -0.05 0.06 0.23 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.01
W_Wages 0.63 0.20 0.18 0.51 0.09 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.09
W_STI 0.23 -0.03 0.08 1.00 1.38 0.37 0.15 -0.02 0.06
W_YC 0.14 0.02 0.08 1.00 2.77 0.53 0.18 0.02 0.07
W_M3 1.00 0.52 0.05 1.00 0.42 0.07 0.99 0.21 0.07
Com. Price 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00
Oil price 0.53 -0.04 0.04 0.99 -0.69 0.19 1.00 -0.12 0.02
US stock price 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.87 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00
US fiscal deficit 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00
US gov. cons. 0.61 -0.04 0.04 0.20 -0.01 0.03 0.21 -0.01 0.02
Note: the three columns report probability that the variable in column help predict Global Inflation, the
coefficient of that variable and its standard deviation. Probabilities supperior to 0.5 and significant
coefficients are in bold charaters. 
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Horizon  Std Error Own lags W_IP COM P W_Wage W_M3 W_Bond W_MMR
1960-2003
4 0.90 83 372122
8 1.49 57 2 14 11 8 6 2
12 1.91 39 5 12 22 14 5 2
16 2.15 31 4 10 29 18 4 3
20 2.35 27 4 8 33 20 4 4
1960-1980
4 0.78 65 0 18 0 2 3 10
8 1.52 24 7 25 5 20 14 5
12 2.03 14 13 17 7 28 15 6
16 2.20 12 12 15 8 30 17 6
20 2.42 10 12 14 7 28 24 6
1981-2003
4 0.64 87 602320
8 0.87 81 406531
12 0.97 77 417732
16 1.05 75 4 0 7 10 2 2
20 1.12 72 4 0 7 13 2 2
Notes: Entries are percentage of the variance of global inflation accounted for by variation in the column
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Note: lambda is the coefficient of projection of national inflation on global inflation. Alpha is the estimated coefficient of 
the error 
correction term. The dependant variable is the first difference of the national inflation rate.
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October 2005Table 6a. RMSE of the Global Inflation model (4) relative to standard benchmarks (1980-2004)
1 step ahead forecast
4 steps ahead forecast



















































































































































































































































































































































Note: ratio of the root mean square error of the Global inflation model forecast to the one obtained with a random walk model (
equation (9) in the main 
text), an AR(4) (equation (8) in the main text), a factor augmented AR(4) (equation (7) in the main text) and a Phillips augmen
ted with commodity prices 
and money (equation (6) in the main text). Evaluation period: 1980-2004.
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October 2005Table 6b. RMSE of the Global Inflation model (4) relative to standard benchmarks (1980-1995)
1 step ahead forecast
4 steps ahead forecast




















































































































































































































































































































































ote: ratio of the root mean square error of the Global inflation model forecast to the one obtained with a random walk model (e
quation (9) in the main 
text), an AR(4) (equation (8) in the main text), a factor augmented AR(4) (equation (7) in the main text) and a Phillips augmen
ted with commodity 
prices and money (equation (6) in the main text). Evaluation period: 1980-2004.
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October 2005Table 6c. RMSE of the Global Inflation model (4) relative to standard benchmarks (1995-2004)
1 step ahead forecast
4 steps ahead forecast



















































































































































































































































































































































Note: ratio of the root mean square error of the Global inflation model forecast to the one obtained with a random walk model (
equation (9) in the 
main text), an AR(4) (equation (8) in the main text), a factor augmented AR(4) (equation (7) in the main text) and a Phillips a
ugmented with 
commodity prices and money (equation (6) in the main text). Evaluation period: 1980-2004.
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October 2005Figure 1: Measures of Global Inflation
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October 2005Figure 2a : G7 and euro area inflation and their projection 
on Global Inflation
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Figure 2b : G7 and euro area inflation and their projection 
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October 2005Figure 3: Measures of Global de-trended Inflation
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